Neutral support for international law: Unwavering support for Ukraine among the Swiss population

Four months ago, Russia invaded Ukraine. The consequences of the war are clearly visible in the form of rising inflation, a large wave of refugees and a continuing risk of military escalation. How does the Swiss population assess the war in Ukraine, the reaction of the Federal Council and the Swiss policy of neutrality in general? Our current survey shows that the feeling of threat in Switzerland has decreased slightly compared to the beginning of the war, but the situation is still seen as threatening. The willingness to support Ukraine remains intact. Similarly, the concept of “cooperative neutrality” is supported by the population, as our analyses show.  

In Switzerland, concern about a possible further escalation of the Ukraine war is high. After four months of war, a large majority of respondents express concern that Russia could use chemical weapons (81%) or nuclear weapons (73%). Around two out of three respondents (63%) fear that the conflict could lead to a third world war, and almost every second person (48%) is concerned about the conflict expanding into a larger war that could also affect Switzerland (see Figure 1). 

What is striking here is that despite these high figures, the level of concern has fallen significantly in some cases compared to mid-March 2022. However, this cannot be attributed to a decrease in the perceived risk of escalation (cf. Figure 2). On the contrary: the probabilities with which the various scenarios are assessed are surprisingly stable and range between 22% (expansion of the war to include Switzerland) and 63% (use of chemical weapons). This suggests a certain habituation effect. Confronted with daily horror images of the war, respondents are still aware of the threat, but they are less afraid than they were 3 months ago. 

At the same time, respondents have become more aware in recent weeks that the war in Ukraine is also having an impact in Switzerland (see Figure 3). Compared to our first survey in March, there is a clear trend towards stronger negative financial impacts on respondents personally (+14 percentage points). While in March 58% of respondents said that the war could have a negative impact on their own finances, in June the figure is already 72%. This is not surprising in view of the worsening economic data: economic forecasts have recently been moderately lowered again and the inflation rate is currently at its highest level for years at 2.9%. The growing concern about an economic downturn is also evident our survey results. 

Solidarity with Ukraine remains high despite financial concerns 

In view of the threatening situation as well as the economic consequences of the war, we wanted to know how strongly the Swiss are prepared to support political measures against Russia? The results reveal a very clear distinction between military measures on the one hand and economic sanctions on the other. While the former such as the deployment of own troops (W2 = 7%), air or cyber-attacks (W2 = 16% or just under 33%) or even arms deliveries (W2 = 36%) are viewed very critically, economic measures continue to find a high level of support. Additional economic sanctions against Russia (72%), import stops of Russian oil (72%) and gas (70%), as well as the confiscation of Russian oligarchs’ assets (68%) are supported by a large majority in each case (cf. Figure 4). 

These results are remarkable for two reasons: Firstly, a majority is still prepared to support the economic sanctions and even more far-reaching measures, even though this could lead to personal financial losses (cf. Figure 5). A majority of respondents would agree to a tightening of sanctions even if this resulted in oil and gas shortages (56%), a significant increase in energy prices (54%) or the general cost of living (52%). Secondly, the willingness of the Swiss to impose even very drastic means in order to support Ukraine with the confiscation of Russian private assets goes far beyond the current freezing of such assets (cf. Figure 4). 

“Cooperative” or “integral” neutrality? 

These findings are also interesting because they shed light on the ongoing discussion about the concrete interpretation of neutrality. At the Word Economic Forum 2022, president of the Swiss Confederation Ignazio Cassis introduced the concept of “cooperative neutrality”, which advocates active intervention to safeguard core values such as human rights or fundamental principles such as the right of states to self-determination, without violating the obligations of a neutral state through military intervention. In contrast, a group of right-wing national conservatives is planning to launch an initiative to anchor a definition of “integral neutrality” in the constitution, whereby Switzerland would not be allowed to take sides in the event of war, either militarily or with sanctions (see, for example, NZZ of 12.03.22). 

The results shown in Figure 6 suggest that the concept of “cooperative neutrality” enjoys strong support in Switzerland. The respondents do not want military intervention of any kind, but economic measures and sanctions directed against Russia’s invasion violating international law. Almost two-thirds of respondents (64%) in the June survey also agree with the statement that Switzerland should clearly commit to Ukraine and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia. Neutrality and economic sanctions are therefore not contradictory for the majority of respondents. 

At the same time, neutrality itself continues to be highly valued by the population. 59% say that Switzerland should remain neutral vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine, and a large majority of 78% thinks that Switzerland should play a mediating role in this conflict. On the one hand, half of those surveyed in June 2022 also reject NATO membership. Although this rejection has fallen since March, it is still more than twice as high as the approval of Switzerland joining NATO (23 %) (cf. Figure 7). Closer cooperation between Switzerland and NATO, on the other hand, is widely supported by 55% of respondents. In summary, the picture is one in which the public continues to value Switzerland’s neutrality but favours a degree of cooperation with states that share Switzerland’s fundamental values and are committed to the rules-based and multilateralised world order. 

In the context of the discussion on the definition of neutrality, the differences between the political camps are also interesting. While there is a bipartisan majority with regard to support for sanctions and the question of a mediating role for Switzerland, the political divide with regard to fundamental questions of neutrality has widened in the last three months (cf. Figure 5). While the majority of respondents on the right and in the centre, for example, want to preserve neutrality vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine, there was no majority among those with a more left-wing political orientation. The group of supporters of neutrality has increased on the right and in the centre since March. In addition, there is now barely a majority on the right to fully support the EU sanctions. A similar picture emerges with regard to NATO. People who tend to belong to the right-wing political spectrum are more likely to reject NATO membership than people on the left. The strongest change has occurred in the centre since March: With +10 percentage points, the proportion of those who are more in favour of joining NATO (wave 1 = 13%; wave 2 = 23%) has increased significantly (cf. Figure 7). Among those with a more right-wing political orientation, 19 % were in favour of joining NATO in June. 

Large majority supports Federal Council policy 

Dealing with the war in Ukraine is also a balancing act for the Federal Council, especially against the backdrop of the discussion on the interpretation of neutrality. Although a majority of respondents (58%) continues to be satisfied with the Federal Council’s handling of the crisis, this proportion has dropped by 13 percentage points compared to March. However, this does not necessarily result in greater dissatisfaction (+7 percentage points); 17% of the respondents are now unsure how to assess the work of the Federal Council, a significant increase by +6 percentage points. This, too, reflects Switzerland’s difficulties in finding the happy medium in this conflict and the increasingly difficult geopolitical world situation. 

Overall, the results show that the Federal Council’s current Ukraine policy is supported by a large majority of the population (cf. Figure 8). Economic measures against Russia receive approval, while military support of any kind is rejected. However, the data also show that opinions are dynamic and change over time. The upcoming debates on neutrality therefore promise to be intense and exciting in terms of public opinion as well. 

Note: An abridged version of the article will also appear on 24.06.22 on the political and social science platform DeFacto and is a collaboration of Prof. Dr. Stefanie Walter and Dr. Sabine Frenzel. Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions or are interested in further information. 

The study at a glance 

Method: online survey via the LINK Panel in Switzerland 

Populations: 1,206 (wave 1) and 1,216 (wave 2) Swiss residents aged 15-79 who are representative of the resident population there, use the internet at least once a week for private purposes and can complete the questionnaire in the national languages. 

Study period wave 1: 17 to 21 March 2022 

Study period wave 2: 03 to 10 June 2022