Ukraine conflict: cooperative neutrality – the Swiss approach in times of war in Europe

We already reported on the perception of the Ukraine conflict in Switzerland back in March. The results of our survey at the time revealed that a large majority of the Swiss population (88%) was concerned about this conflict (LINK, March 28, 2022, Ukraine, sanctions and further measures: what Switzerland thinks (in German)). The findings also revealed how people both in Switzerland and abroad view the Swiss policy of neutrality. A number of selected results that were previously unpublished can now be found in this article.

Neutrality despite sanctions is not a contradiction but a conscious commitment to defending democratic values

In light of the Russian war of aggression, Switzerland has already implemented most of the EU sanctions and in doing so, redefined its status of neutrality. But how far can and, indeed, should the concept of neutrality be stretched in the future? Since the veto on the delivery of Swiss-made tank ammunition to Ukraine by Germany at the latest, calls for the possibility of even going so far as to supply weapons in order to defend freedom and democracy have been growing louder in various political circles, especially within the Centre, FDP and Green Liberal parties. According to our data, the decision by the Swiss Federal Council to support the EU sanctions just a few weeks into the war reflected the wishes of the population, most of whom, according to the survey, no longer support a policy of “exclusive” neutrality.

Acceptance of a neutral Swiss approach to the implementation of sanctions against Russia is low in both Germany (26%) and France (21%). This interesting outside-in view was made possible by the collection of data from respondents in Germany and France via the YouGov panels. The Swiss opinion on the same topic was investigated in the representative LINK panel, in which a majority of 56% of Swiss respondents supported the idea of taking a neutral approach to Russia and Ukraine. This perspective is clearly consistent with Switzerland’s historical neutral status, which, according to the data gathered by LINK, is much more firmly anchored in western Switzerland than in German-speaking Switzerland.

Nonetheless, a clear majority of 65% of the Swiss respondents support a full commitment to the EU sanctions and in doing so, go against the policy of neutrality also supported by the majority of the population. This shows that the population supports the decision made by the Swiss Federal Council. That said, the results also demonstrate a certain ambivalence among the Swiss population when it comes to the Swiss status of neutrality and show how difficult it is to interpret a policy of neutrality in accordance with the wishes of the entire population within the area of conflict of pragmatic political requirements in times of crisis. A large proportion of the populations in Switzerland’s directly neighboring countries, Germany (51%) and France (41%), also believe that sanctions do not have to contradict Switzerland’s neutral position. According to these results, the Swiss President Ignazio Cassis reflected the current mood when he spoke of a “cooperative neutrality” in his opening speech at the World Economic Forum.

Trust in the political leadership is much higher in Switzerland than in Germany and France

Against this background, it comes as no surprise that a majority of 59% of the Swiss respondents trust their own political leaders to make the right decisions with regard to the war in Ukraine. In Germany, on the other hand, Chancellor Scholz is only supported by an extremely narrow majority of 51%. Although the largest proportion of French respondents (46%) trust President Macron, the share of the population that does not trust its leader, namely 42%, is higher than in all other countries.

This large degree of trust is certainly also a defining factor behind the fact that the Swiss population is less concerned about the current situation in Ukraine – with only 24% of respondents claiming that they are worried compared to 63% in Germany and 31% in France. The war seems to be further away from Switzerland than from Germany and France.

That said, the discussion is still only just beginning, especially given that the war is getting closer and closer to Switzerland, which has now welcomed more than 50,000 Ukrainian refugees (as of May 20, 2022, Swiss State Secretariat for Migration). The Russian war of aggression was also the focus of discussion at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, which showed that extraordinary situations also require extraordinary measures. After all, who would have thought a year ago that the WEF would take place without Russian involvement, that deglobalization would be a hotly discussed topic beyond the realms of the WEF or that the EU states would come together to impose sanctions against Russia repeatably within a matter of days?

The discussion on the future Swiss policy of neutrality is sure to go on for a long time. Ultimately, there is no foundation for a clear or ‘pure’ interpretation of the Swiss policy of neutrality, at least not from a historical perspective, as is shown by a look at the literature on the history of Swiss neutrality, for example the works of Edgar Bonjour, Daniel Bourgeois, Klaus Urner and even Georg Kreis.

An overview of the study

Method: Online survey conducted with the LINK panel in Switzerland and YouGov panels in Germany and France

Populations: 1,206 respondents in Switzerland, 1,841 in Germany and 1,739 in France who are aged between 15 and 79 years old (18 and 79 in Germany and France), representative of the population in the country in which they reside, use the Internet for private purposes at least once a week and were able to complete the survey in the national languages of their countries.

Study period in Switzerland: March 17 to 21, 2022

Study period in Germany: March 9 to 13, 2022

Study period in France: March 16 to 21, 2022